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The late 1970s witnessed the birth of Argumentation Theory as such. If these
things can be pinpointed at all, then the beginnings of this field can be identified with
several key events and the presentation of certain central theories. One such event is
being commemorated at this very conference, viz., the creation of the journal Informal
Logic 25 years ago. One other major contributing stream was the appearance in the
Journal of the American Forensic Association [JAFA], (now known as Argumentation &
Advocacy,) of a series of articles specifically discussing issues of interpersonal
argumentation. Such familiar names as Brockriede, Burleson, Wenzel, O’Keefe, Hample,
and Willard among many others contributed to early discussions concerning the nature
and structure of argumentation. Indeed, it was in the pages of JAFA that van Eemeren &
Grootendorst first introduced themselves to the North American argumentation
community.
My topic today begins with an issue that appeared in the pages of JAFA in the late
1970s. This is an issue that arose in discussions between Charles Willard, Brant Burleson,
and Daniel O’Keefe concerning the relationship between arguments, premises in
arguments, and the discursiveness of those premises. I will argue, with Willard, that
discursiveness cannot be a requirement for something’s being a premise in an argument,
and that there are innumerable instances when we rely on non-discursive communications
in order to put forward, respond to, and comprehend an argument. More specifically, I
argue that the requirement that a non-discursive message, communication, event, or
activity be linguistically explicable in order for it to be part of the argument is both too
restrictive and impractical.
In various articles, but especially in “On the Utility of Descriptive Diagrams for
the Analysis and Criticism of Arguments” (1976), Charles Willard mounts an attack on
the idea that arguments and their premises must be linguistically explicable. The attack
takes the form of a criticism of descriptive diagrams as models of argument, and has three
fronts. First, the argument critic is encouraged, even forced, to change the argument to
match the model. Secondly, all the components of the argument being analyzed must be
linguistic. And, finally, the model one ends up with is isolated from the context in which
it originally appears. Willard has discussed these issues at length and in detail (1976,
1978, 1978b, 1979, 1981, 1985, and 1989 among others,) and Gilbert, more recently, has
continued the debate (1989, 2001, 2002 among others). Rather than repeat these
arguments, I would like to address two underlying issues that are vital to understanding
these matters. The first, already articulated, is the requirement that all components of an
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argument be either discursive or linguistically explicable, and the second is the question
of what exactly is the basic kind of argument with which we naturally deal.
Prof. Ralph Johnson is quite unequivocal that the epitome of argument is written;
that when argument occurs in its most pristine form, it is not spoken, not an interactive
undertaking between two or more social actors. Rather, it is something concrete, wholly
linguistic, locatable in space/time, and not subject to immediate revision, correction, or
withdrawal (2000, 156). While it is clear that all of this renders the argument most
suitable for analysis, the question remains as to whether or not we learn most about
argument by studying it in isolation from its natural interactive habitat or from examining
it in laboratory like isolation. This view takes a narrow academic approach to argument
and considers it clearest and most comprehensible when it is static and technical. This
shall, therefore, be known as the Narrow Academic Static Technical or NAST view
(pronounced NASTy). The alternative view relies on a more Natural, Interactive and
Contextual approach, and shall be abbreviated the NIC view (pronounced NICe).
Let me now get more specific. At various times and in various conferences, I have
been asked, especially by Prof. Johnson, a fierce proponent of the NASTy view, why I
insist on labeling as arguments, the sorts of non-linear non-discursive examples with
which I come up. These examples include such instances as Mrs. Burns giving Mr. Burns
a neck massage, and thus bringing him to the realization that she was correct when she
said he was tense. The massage, the NASTy view maintains, is not an argument because
it is not a discursive entity and not linguistically explicable. It cannot be linguistically
explicable because it is a complex interactive event, not something like a nod or an
enthymematic premiss. It is, however, linguistically describable. In fact, I did so in
reciting the example: Mrs. Burns gave Mr. Burns a massage. However, being
linguistically describable is not sufficient for being an argument.
Johnson is not alone in his NASTy delineation of argument. Brant Burleson
(1979, 1981) was a major progenitor and NASTy critic of Willard, a NICe proponent.
Burleson argues at length in both papers that arguments must be such that all components
are linguistically explicable, and that the non-discursive elements are extraneous, and not
part of the argument except insofar as they are so translatable. In his 1979 SCA paper he
cites as an example a perfectly fine argument, the sort he says that argumentation
theorists ought study, a paradigm, if you will, of a real argument. The argument he cites
is as follows.
Example 1: Women Cops
Mark: Women cops, you know, would lead to more violence. There’s no
question about it.
Krista: What? Why?
Mark: Well, men have always been the enforcement figures. It is easier for us to
obey men since most of us were obedient to fathers. The cop on the beat has a
whole historical tradition and psychology to back him up. That’s why he survives
as well as he does. Women don’t have that tradition, so they are more likely to
get attacked. When that happens they’ll have to use force and guns more often
themselves. See what I mean?
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Krista: What sort of drugstore psychology is that? As soon as it is understood
that women are not going to take crap when they’re cops, they’ll have all the
respect they need.
Mark: But how many people will be hurt while they earn that respect? Anyway,
it sounds more like fear to me.
Krista: Mark, that’s just the point. Maybe it’s necessary to hurt some people in
order to get the idea across that women can do anything. It shouldn’t be
necessary to earn respect, but it is. Does that mean we have to stay home and
cook? It’s not our fault women aren’t respected. Why should we suffer for it?
Mark: Well, I just hope you never have to arrest me, that’s all.
This argument, Burleson says using O’Keefe’s (1977) distinction, “clearly
constitutes an argument-2” (970), and in his second set of statements Mark makes what
“can be meaningfully construed as an ‘argument-1’ ” (971).
So, what are the characteristics of this example that makes Burleson favour it?
Well, first of all it is discursive, that is, it occurs in language. Secondly, it involves a
discussion consisting of a claim put forward and then questioned, followed by reasons
presented for that claim. We may also assume that Burleson chose the example because
it has a natural feel, and seems like an argument that we might come across in real life.
So, let us examine this paradigm argument closer. Burleson’s NASTy view requires
three criteria “that seem to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for
characterizing a piece of discourse as an argument-1” (1981, 142). These are that 1] an
assertion is put forward for an interlocutor to believe; 2] the interaction is organized
around the defense of the claim and specifically involves reasons being presented in
support; and 3] the “movement from support to assertion involves an inferential leap”
(1981, 142, italics in original).
Mark’s claim that women being police officers would lead to more violence
clearly meets Burleson’s first criterion for being an argument-1 insofar as a claim is
asserted for Krista to believe. The exemplar argument also meets criterion [2] which
states that, “Arguments are organized around the defense of the claim.” This means that
the claim must have “a statement or set of statements adduced in its support” (141). By
using the term “statements” Burleson does not want to completely exclude non-discursive
communications. He says: “The reasons given in support of a claim may not always be
made explicit in discourse” (1981, 142). That is, looks or signals can express reasons,
but, presumably, not be reasons. A mugger's desperate look may express a reason, but
against Willard, Burleson states that a reason’s being expressed non-discursively does not
mean that a careful critic cannot pull it out.
Burleson’s view is in concord with D. O’Keefe’s views as also expressed in JAFA
(1977) and especially in O’Keefe (1982). Here we are told that the paradigm cases of an
argument-2 are those that demonstrate “overt extended disagreement between the
interactants” (9). This broad explanation covers a wide range of examples that may well
be broader than Burleson would like. Nonetheless, the NASTy view is saved by the
introduction of a narrower paradigm for argument-1, wherein “both the claim and the
overtly expressed reason(s) must be linguistically explicable-which is not to say
linguistically explicit” (13). In order to explore this further, I would like to present
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another section from the same argument that Burleson quoted in 1974, but that he did not
include as an exemplar.
Example 2 The Proof
Krista: You think men would have an easier time arresting criminals than
women would? Is that right?
Mark: Exactly, I just can’t see how...
Krista: Wait. I want to get straight on this. If I can convince you that a
woman can have as easy a time as a man in an arrest situation, then you’ll
agree?
Mark: Sure. You convince me that any woman will have as easy a time
and you’re in.
Krista: No. Not any woman. Any woman who wants to be a cop and
meets the requirements. After all, there are lots of guys who would have
trouble arresting a kid.
Mark: O.K., you’re on.
α:
[Krista reaches over to Mark, grabs his arm and flips him over. He
ends up on the floor, unhurt but chagrined, and Krista has a firm hammer
lock on him. Since this conversation is taking place in New York, no one
else in the bar has noticed.]1
The question now arises whether or not the throwing of Mark by Krista, i.e., α, is
an argument-1. I believe that for both Burleson and O’Keefe there are grounds for saying
either that it is an argument-1 or is part of an argument-1, e.g., a premise in an argument1. It is important to remember when considering O’Keefe’s argument-1 that he is
searching not for a definition that would exclude arguments that are not easily
linguistically explicable, but rather he is searching for the paradigm cases we can use to
study the more fringe or difficult situations. Thus he writes the following.
In saying that in paradigm cases of argument-making the overtly expressed
reasons are linguistically explicit, I am not saying that a person’s reasons for making a
claim must be either linguistically explicit or explicable. There is nothing in my analysis
that conflicts with Willard’s (1979, 211) view that ‘non-discursive elements often reside
at the center of a person’s reasons and reasonings,’ so long as ‘reasons’ and ‘reasonings’
are understood as something different from overtly expressed reasons. (1982, 15, italics
original.)
Thus α may be a perfectly acceptable argument-1 or part of an argument-1,
though not, perhaps, a paradigm case of one. In addition, one may object to it on the
grounds that it crosses the boundaries of civil communication and introduces an untoward
degree of violence. Similarly, Burleson’s gun toting assailant who persuades by pointing
his gun is also committing a fallacy ad baculum, but is, nonetheless, “expressing” his
reasons. Still, I think it is important to be specific and clarify. The throw of Mark by
Krista is an argument or a premise in an argument. The action itself, the very event is an
argument, and, using my 1989 notation, we would say that the argument proceeds as
follows.
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Example 3 The Proof – CRC
Krista: Some women can overpower some men.
Mark: No they can’t.
Krista: [[Throws mark]]
In Example 3 the last line is marked by double braces indicating that the action
itself is in the argument. Personally, I see nothing wrong with this, and, moreover, do not
see how it can be avoided. The action of throwing a person cannot be made linguistically
explicit, though it can be described. Actions such as α are complex human interactions
and cannot be reduced to something else. To attempt to do so is to commit the logocentric
fallacy wherein one assumes without warrant that language is clearer and less ambiguous
than actions (Gilbert 2002). To emphasize this point I want to compare Example 2 to
Example 4 Talk Don’t Show. In this case we imagine that instead of the action, labeled α
that Krista performs at the end of Example 2, the following ensued.
Example 4 Talk Don’t Show
Krista: No. Not any woman. Any woman who wants to be a cop and
meets the requirements. After all, there are lots of guys who would have
trouble arresting a kid.
Mark: O.K., you’re on.
Krista: Well, now, you know I’ve studied karate a fair while, right?
Mark: Yeah, sure, so?
Krista: So, don’t you think I could throw you?
Mark: (Looking suddenly nervous.) Uh, yeah, I suppose you could.
Krista: OK, then, so you agree some women can subdue some men?
Mark: Yes, I guess I do.
This bit of discourse results in a CRC as follows.
Example 5 Talk Don’t Show – CRC - β
Krista can throw Mark
Krista is a woman
Mark is a man
Therefore, Some women can throw some men.
This argument is a paradigm case of an argument-1, and one cannot imagine
anyone denying it, or that it derives from Example 4 in a straightforward way. But there
is a problem, and it is just what the NICe theorists are claiming. That is, the movement
from Example 4 to Example 5 is as laden with difficulty as is the move from Example 2
to Example 3. All translation, in other words, is subject to error and mis- or reinterpretation. My rendition of Johnson’s theory will be critiqued by him as in error even
though I am appealing to the very language he uses in his book. Similarly, my description
of an event as a component of an argument must also be subject to the parameters of
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translation. I cannot, therefore, see why something that is non-discursive is not treated in
precisely the same way as something discursive. α is a part of the argument, even though
it is an action. It does not express a premise, it is a premise.
The chief difficulty with the NASTy view is the claim that components of a
paradigm argument must be linguistically explicit. The fact is, extremely few arguments
ever occur without some parts being implicit. Even arguments in mathematics and logic
are frequently ended with the terrifying tag line that the obvious proof is left to the
reader. If this is the case, then what is it that makes arguments that are linguistically
explicit paradigmatic? If almost all arguments, whether written or spoken, whether
monological or dialogical contain components not linguistically explicit, then how do we
come to say that only arguments that are linguistically explicable are paradigmatic? Put
in other words, if arguments typically contain non-discursive elements, why would we
want to point to an argument that does not have that characteristic as a prime example?
That is the question the NICe people ask the NASTy people.
So, my conclusion, is that α, the throwing of Mark by Krista is a part of the
argument, and that it may be linguistically described, but that it is the action itself,
[[Krista throws Mark]] that is a premise, and not the description. As a result, we must
conclude that the throwing of Mark by Krista in the context in which it took place was an
argument, every bit as much as the discursive analogue in Example 4. It is an argument
because it is used to prove the point that women can be effective in subduing male
culprits, and, therefore, serve as police officers.
I would like at this point to consider the position of a very nice person who is a
card carrying NASTy theorist, viz., Ralph Johnson. In his recent book, Manifest
Rationality, Johnson asserts that written argument is “a more suitable foundation for the
practice” of argumentation, than oral argument (156). But for Johnson, the written
remains fundamental because it is less changeable and more straightforwardly a product
than its oral cousin.2 Oddly enough, Johnson immediately moves on to speak as if oral
argument was the basic form required. The process of arguing is an “interchange between
two or more participants” (ibid). However, the object of NASTy veneration is not the
process, but the product of the process: “At a certain point in the process, the arguer
distils elements from what has transpired and encodes them in the form of an argument”
(159). This product is the distillate that is the epitome of the practice of argument. But
this seems to indicate that the process is ontologically more fundamental than the
product, since without the process the product does not come into existence.
It is important to realize that the exclusion of certain factors as arguments seems
to rely on the distinction between the process of arguing and the product produced by that
process. This is a NASTy distinction that most NICe theorists would not really allow.
Rather, the NICe theorist will, at best, see the written argument or speech as a snapshot of
the process at a given moment in time, much as the inventory of a grocery store accounts
for its contents at some specific moment: as soon as the inventory is complete, it changes
with the first customer. I have no problem at all with there being such argument products,
though, with Willard, I believe they cannot really be understood independent of the
process used in arriving at them. Johnson could well agree with this, as it is important to
him that the dialectical tier be rich and active. He even allows that the distillate might be
provisional, and that the process may continue to make the argument stronger.
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So, why does Johnson ask me why I want something like α, the throwing of Mark
by Krista, to be considered an argument? Clearly it is relevant to the argument, something
Johnson would agree to,3 and it is certainly part of the process going on between Mark
and Krista. The issue then is that it is not linguistic, non-discursive. And, again, it is not
that the description would not be a part of a description of the argument, but that the act
itself is not part of the argument. But, and here I reiterate my argument, all descriptions of
an argument require translation, modification, alteration, and that is just what is required
of α. So, why should β be a legitimate part of the argument, but not α? The answer is
found in an application of the logocentric fallacy, wherein it is supposed that linguistic
messages are more straightforward and less ambiguous than non-linguistic messages
(Gilbert, 2002).
I believe that the NASTy view ultimately rests on an understanding of argument
as to one degree or another a product.4 And, this is not something I have a great
difficulty with; arguments as products allow us to speak about them, analyze their
informal logic, review their rhetorical components, and so on. The only difficulty I have
is in supposing that the argument as product is, in fact, The Argument, and that the
product has, thereby, a special status. The NASTy fear is that if there is no such
differentiation, then the argument becomes a morass, a swamp full of all sorts of things
that cannot be separated.
The slippery slope of allowing non-discursive entities into the idea of what is an
argument needs to be avoided, but it cannot. It cannot because we have some instances
where we have no doubt that the non-discursive elements are an integral part. These
elements include enthymematic premises, accepted and standard gestures such as nods,
shakes and certain hand movements, and contextual information that indicates how an
ambiguous word or words should be understood. But if my nod is allowed in, then why
not my grimace? If my enthymeme is all right, then why not my tears? How do we allow
some messages to be components of an argument but not others. I do not understand, and,
it seems to me the burden of proof falls to the NASTy theorists.
Having made the easy point, I move to a harder one. For, while I do not
understand why the NASTy group is so opposed to an open definition of argument, what
I do understand is that the NICe theorists may want to push things too far: the NICe guys
may not know where to stop. This is true, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 6 A Cuppa
Ahmed and Lorraine are having a discussion, somewhat heated, about
whether or not their son, Mohamed should go to a public school or a
private school. The discussion has been going on for an hour and shows
no signs of abating. At this point, Ahmed gets up and puts on a kettle.
When it comes to a boil, he makes each of them a cup of tea. Then, with a
smile, he places Lorraine’s in front of her.
I want to claim that, ceteris paribus, Ahmed’s making and serving Loraine a cup
of tea is part of the argument. 5 Exactly what part is open for discussion, but a part is.
Perhaps, in Informal Logic terms, it might be construed as a sub-argument, wherein
Ahmed is pointing out to Lorraine that they are in this together. Or, it might be, in
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Pragma-Dialectic terms, a brief return to the opening stage of the argument in order to set
the standards for cooperation and problem-solving. In any event, a proper understanding
of the process that is their argument necessitates an examination of all its parts. Ahmed’s
making a kind gesture speaks volumes, even though it is non-discursive.
The NASTy theorists are correct to be suspicious of the NICe guys. There is an
agenda to extend and open the meaning of ‘argument’ and to include within that rubric a
great deal that some would consider foreign. Thus, the two misleading, albeit amusing,
acronyms I introduced, ‘NASTy’ and ‘NICe’ are a part of my argument for the inclusion
of non-discursive elements in the realm of argument. An obvious rhetorical device, it
nonetheless makes the point that language shades meanings, and that calling the enemy a
“terrorist” as opposed to a “freedom fighter” is a part of the argument.
While I admit it is useful to consider argument as product, especially for
pedagogical purposes, and I happily announce my belief that Informal Logic is an
important and vital subject of study and practice, I do feel that argument must be
understood as a broad and open practice. I hope the arguments I presented above can help
to demonstrate that a narrow understanding of argument as necessarily linguistically
explicable is incorrect. For now, it just remains to be said that all the NASTy theorists I
know are actually very nice, and even that some of the NICe ones can sometimes be
nasty.
Notes
1

I must confess that the reason I am aware of the missing parts of Burleson’s argument
is that it is taken from my book, How to Win An Argument (Gilbert 1979) now in a
second edition (Gilbert 1996).

2

Johnson claims that the importance of written argument is demonstrated by the fact that
without it, Plato’s arguments would not be with us today. I find this a strange sort of
support since it is the invention of writing and not written arguments that is responsible,
and it is, after all, the Socratic Dialogues, a series of oral arguments, that Plato captured.
Moreover, in cultures without writing and prior to writing, mythology, legend and history
are transmitted via story, a linguistic enterprise.

3

This is made clear in email correspondence. Johnson has said that such things are
relevant to the argument, but are not arguments.

4

Another more recent proponent of the NASTy view is Scott Jacobs. In a recent article
(Jacobs, 2000) he distinguishes between those things that are part of the argument, and
numerous surrounding aspects that are not. Goodwin agrees with him in her response.
(Goodwin, 2000).

5

The ceteris paribus is meant to cover such possibilities as Ahmed’s knowing that
Lorraine despises tea, and so on. Also, there is no guarantee at all that the kind of gesture
will be appreciated or accepted at face value.
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